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Abstract—In this paper, we develop a social group utility maxi-
mization (SGUM) framework for cooperative wireless networking
that takes into account both social relationships and physical
coupling among users. Specifically, instead of maximizing its
individual utility or the overall network utility, each user aims
to maximize its social group utility that hinges heavily on
its social tie structure with other users. We show that this
framework provides rich modeling flexibility and spans the
continuum between non-cooperative game and network utility
maximization (NUM) – two traditionally disjoint paradigms for
network optimization. Based on this framework, we study three
important applications of SGUM, in database assisted spectrum
access, power control, and random access control, respectively.
For the case of database assisted spectrum access, we show that
the SGUM game is a potential game and always admits a socially-
aware Nash equilibrium (SNE). To overcome the suboptimality
associated with the asynchronous best response update approach,
we develop a randomized distributed spectrum access algorithm
that can asymptotically converge to the optimal SNE with
high probability. Using spectral gap analysis and path coupling
argument, we derive upper bounds on the convergence time in
the Glauber dynamics and also quantify the trade-off between
the performance and convergence time of the algorithm. We
further show that the performance gap of SNE by the algorithm
from the NUM solution decreases as the strength of social ties
among users increases and the performance gap is zero when
the strengths of social ties among users reach the maximum
values. For the cases of power control and random access
control, we show that there exists a unique SNE. Furthermore,
as the strength of social ties increases from the minimum to the
maximum, a player’s SNE strategy (i.e., access probability or
transmit power) migrates from the Nash equilibrium strategy in
a standard non-cooperative game to the socially-optimal strategy
in network utility maximization. Numerical results corroborate
that the SGUM solutions can achieve superior performance using
real social data trace. Furthermore, we show that the SGUM
framework can be generalized to take into account both positive
and negative social ties among users. The generalized SGUM
framework also encompasses the zero-sum game as a special case
and can be a useful tool for studying network security problems.
Index Terms—Cooperative Networking, Mobile Social Net-
working, Social Group Utility Maximization, Game Theory
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile networks have been projected to continue growing
rapidly in the foreseeable future. For example, mobile phone
shipments are projected to reach 11.5 billions in 2019 [1] and
mobile data traffic is predicted to grow further by over 100
times in the next ten years [1]. Different from other networks
(e.g., sensor networks), a distinctive characteristic of mobile
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Fig. 1. An illustration of the social group utility maximization framework.
In the physical domain, users have different physical coupling subject to
physical relationships (e.g., interference). In the social domain, users have
heterogeneous social coupling due to the social ties among users.
networks is that mobile devices are carried and operated by
human beings. With the explosive growth of online social
networks such as Facebook and Twitter, more and more people
are actively involved in online social interactions, and social
relationships among people are hence extensively broadened
and significantly enhanced. Then it is natural to ask whether
“social relationships” among mobile users can impact the
communications and interactions among their devices, and
if yes, how the social structure can be cleverly leveraged?
With this insight, as illustrated in Figure 1, we view a mobile
network as an overlay/underlay system where a “virtual social
network” overlays the physical communication network (the
“social network” is virtual, in the sense that the social tie
structure therein results from existing human relationship and
online social networks), and leverage the intrinsic social tie
structure among mobile users to facilitate cooperative wireless
networking.
With this motivation, we advocate a novel social group util-
ity maximization (SGUM) framework that takes into account
both the users’ social relationships and physical coupling. As
illustrated in Figure 1, a key observation is that users are
coupled not only in the physical domain due to the physical
relationship (e.g., interference), and but also in the social
domain due to the social ties among them. It would be a
win-win case for users to help those users having social
ties with them. Specifically, we cast the distributed decision
making problem for cooperative networking among users as
a SGUM game, where each user maximizes its social group
utility, defined as the sum of its own individual utility and
the weighted sum of the utilities of other users having social
tie with it. Interestingly, as illustrated in Figure 2, the SGUM
framework can bridge the gap between non-cooperative game
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Fig. 2. Network optimization with different users’ social awareness levels
and network utility maximization – two traditionally disjoint
paradigms for network optimization. These two paradigms are
captured under the proposed framework as two special cases
where no social tie exists among users (i.e., users are socially
oblivious) and all users are connected by the strongest social
ties (i.e., users are fully altruistic), respectively.
To get a more concrete sense of the SGUM framework,
in this paper we study three important network applications,
namely, database assisted spectrum access, power control,
and random access control. For the case of database assisted
spectrum access, we prove that the SGUM game is a potential
game and always admits a socially-aware Nash equilibrium
(SNE). Moreover, we show that the potential function of the
game exhibits a nice structure that can be decomposed into two
parts, capturing the impact of the physical coupling and social
coupling in spectrum access, respectively. To overcome the
drawback that the asynchronous best response update approach
would achieve a suboptimal SNE, we design a randomized
distributed spectrum access algorithm that can achieve the
optimal SNE (that maximizes the potential function) of the
SGUM game for database assisted spectrum access. Using
Markov chain uniformization and spectral analysis, we derive
an upper bound on the convergence time in the Glauber
dynamics and also quantify the trade-off between the per-
formance and convergence time of the algorithm. We further
derive the upper-bound of the performance gap of the SNE
from the NUM solution, and show that the upper-bound of
the performance gap decreases as the strength of social ties
among users increases and the performance gap is zero when
the strengths of social ties among users reach the maximum
values.
For the cases of power control and random access control,
we show that there exists a unique SNE. Furthermore, as the
strength of social ties increases from the minimum (selfish) to
the maximum (fully altruistic), a player’s SNE strategy (i.e.,
access probability or transmit power) migrates from the Nash
equilibrium strategy in a standard non-cooperative game to the
social-optimal strategy in network utility maximization.
We should emphasize that the SGUM framework highlights
the interplay between the physical coupling subject to users’
physical relationships and the social coupling due to the social
ties among users. The SGUM framework spans the continuum
between non-cooperative game and network utility maximiza-
tion – two extreme paradigms based on drastically different
assumptions that users are selfish and altruistic, respectively,
and hence can provide rich flexibility for modeling cooperative
networking problems.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We discuss the
related work in Section II and introduce the SGUM framework
in Section III. We apply the framework to the applications
of database assisted spectrum access, power control, random
access control in Sections V, VI, and IV, respectively. We
discuss the possible generalization of the SGUM framework
in Section VII, and finally conclude the paper in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
Game theory has been extensively used for a variety of
networking applications [2]. A standard non-cooperative game
assumes that all users are selfish, i.e., each user cares about
only its own welfare and behaves without regard to its impact
on other users. Along a different line, network utility maxi-
mization has been extensively studied for resource allocation
problems of various networks [3], where all users are assumed
to have the same objective of maximizing the total welfare of
all users (i.e., network utility). However, all these paradigms
cannot capture a mobile social network where users have
diverse social relationships, which is a primary objective of
the SGUM framework under consideration. In fact, the SGUM
framework provides rich modeling flexibility by spanning the
continuum between these traditionally disjoint paradigms.
Although there exists a significant body of work on non-
cooperative game and network utility maximization, very
little attention has been paid to the continuum between these
extreme paradigms, especially in the context of mobile social
networks. Recent works [4], [5] have studied the impact
of altruistic behavior in a routing game. [6] has recently
investigated a random access game between two symmet-
rically altruistic users. [7] introduces different approaches
to integrate user’s social awareness into the payoff function
design, including the cases that a user cares about only its
best/worst performing friend or the friends within some spe-
cific communities (e.g., the cliques by partitioning the social
graph). Moreover, [7] considers only the binary social setting
(i.e., friend or not). In contrast, in the SGUM framework we
consider a general weighted social graph and define the social
group utility function as the weighted sum of the individual
utilities of the social neighbors with the weights proportional
to the social tie strength among the users. [8] considers a
similar socially-aware payoff function as that in the SGUM
framework. Nevertheless, [8] focuses on the symmetric social
network and mainly considers the congestion game in which
the payoff of a player depends on the number of players
choosing the same strategy. In contrast, the payoff of a user
in the SGUM games in mobile networks depends on a variety
of factors including interference relationships and the specific
interacting user set. We should emphasize that a key objective
of this paper to develop a general modeling framework for
exploiting the social relationships among users for cooperative
wireless networking design. To this end, we propose the
SGUM framework and introduce both physical and social
graphs to model the physical and social couplings among
users in both physical and social domains, respectively. We
also highlight its connections with non-cooperative game and
NUM, two widely adopted modeling frameworks in wireless
networks. These features are missing in [7], [8].
The social aspect is now becoming a new and important
dimension for communication system design [9], [10]. As the
development of online and mobile social networks such as
Facebook and Twitter, more and more real-world data and
traces of human social interactions are being generated. This
enables researchers and engineers to observe, analyze, and
incorporate the social factors into engineering system design
in a way never previously possible [9]. A channel recom-
mendation system based on cooperative social interactions is
developed for dynamic spectrum access in [11]. Gao et al.
in [12] exploited social structures such as social community
to design efficient data forwarding and routing algorithms in
delay tolerant networks. Hui et al. in [13] used the social
betweenness and centrality as the forwarding metric. Costa et
al. in [14] proposed predictions based on metrics of social
interaction to identify the best information carriers for content
publish-subscribe.
III. A SOCIAL GROUP UTILITY MAXIMIZATION (SGUM)
FRAMEWORK
In this section we introduce the SGUM framework for
cooperative networking. As illustrated in Figure 1, the frame-
work can be projected onto two domains: the physical domain
and the social domain. In the physical domain, different
wireless users have different physical coupling due to their
heterogeneous physical relationships (e.g., interference). In the
social domain, different users have different social coupling
due to their intrinsic social ties. We next discuss both physical
and social domains in detail.
A. A Physical Network Graph Model
We consider a set of wireless users N = {1, 2, ..., N} where
N is the total number of users. We denote the set of feasible
strategies for each user n ∈ N as Xn. For instance, a strategy
x ∈ Xn can be choosing either a channel or a power level
for wireless transmissions. Subject to heterogeneous physical
constraints, the strategy set Xn can be user-specific. For
example, the strategy set Xn can be a set of feasible relay users
that are in vicinity of user n for cooperative communication.
To capture the physical coupling among the users in the
physical domain, we introduce the physical graph Gp =
{N , Ep} (see Figure 1 for example). Here the set of users N
is the vertex set, and Ep , {(n,m) : epnm = 1, ∀n,m ∈ N} is
the edge set where epnm = 1 if and only if users n and m have
physical coupling, i.e., users n and m can affect each other’s
payoff by taking some actions. For example, two users have
the physical coupling if they can cause interference to each
other when using the same channel for data transmission. We
also denote the set of users that have physical coupling with
user n as N pn , {m ∈ N : e
p
nm = 1}.
Let x = (x1, ..., xN ) ∈
∏N
n=1 Xn be the strategy profile of
all users. Given the strategy profile x, the individual utility
function of user n is denoted as Un(x), which represents
the payoff of user n, accounting for the physical coupling
among users. For example, Un(x) can be the achieved data
rate or the satisfaction of quality of service (QoS) requirement
of user n under the strategy profile x. Note that in general the
underlying physical graph plays a critical role in determining
the individual utility Un(x). For example, users’ achieved data
rates are determined by the interference graph and channel
quality.
B. A Social Network Graph Model
We next introduce the social graph model to describe the so-
cial ties among users. The underlying rationale of considering
social ties is that the hand-held devices are carried by human
beings and the knowledge of human social ties can be utilized
to enhance the performance of cooperative networking.
Specifically, we introduce the social graph Gs = {N , Es}
to model the social ties among the users. Here the vertex set
is the same as the user set N and the edge set is given as
Es = {(n,m) : esnm = 1, ∀n,m ∈ N} where esnm = 1 if and
only if users n and m have social tie between each other, which
can be kinship, friendship, or colleague relationship between
two users. Furthermore, for a pair of users n and m who have
a social edge between them on the social graph, we formalize
the strength of social tie as wnm ∈ [0, 1], with a higher value
of wnm being a stronger social tie. We define user n’s social
group N sn as the set of users that have social ties with user n,
i.e., N sn = {m : esnm = 1, ∀m ∈ N}.
To identify the social relationships among users, two
users can locally carry out the identification process through
the proximity communications (e.g., using Bluetooth/WiFi-
Direct/Device-To-Device communications). Two users can de-
tect their social relationship by carrying out the “matching”
process to identify the common social features among them.
For example, two users can match their mobile phones’ contact
books. If they have the phone numbers of each other or many
of their phone numbers are the same, then it is very likely
that they know each other. As another example, two users can
match their home and working addresses and identify whether
they are neighbors or colleagues. Furthermore, two users can
detect the social relationship among them by accessing to
the online social networks such as Facebook and Twitter.
For example, Facebook has exposed access to their social
graph including the objects of friends, events, groups, profile
information, and photos. Any authenticated Facebook user can
have access to these information through the OpenGraph API
[15]. Based on the identified social relationships, a user n
can then specify the social tie strength wnm towards its social
neighbors m in the social group N sn .
Based on the physical and social graph models above,
users are coupled in the physical domain due to the physical
relationships, and also coupled in the social domain due to
the social ties among them. It would be a win-win case for
users to help those users having social ties with them. With
this insight, we further define the social group utility of each
user n as
Sn(x) = Un(x) +
∑
m∈N sn
wnmUm(x). (1)
It follows that the social group utility of each user consists
of two parts: 1) its own individual utility and 2) the weighted
sum of the individual utilities of other users having social ties
with it. In a nutshell, the social group utility function captures
the feature that each user is socially-aware and cares about the
users having social ties with it.
C. Social Group Utility Maximization Game
We next consider the distributed decision making problem
among the users, aiming to maximize their social group
utilities. Let x−n = (x1, ..., xn−1, xn+1, ..., xN ) be the set of
strategies chosen by all other users except user n. Given the
other users’ strategies x−n, user n wants to choose a strategy
xn ∈ Xn to maximize its social group utility, i.e.,
max
xn∈Xn
Sn(xn, x−n), ∀n ∈ N .
The distributed nature of the problem above naturally leads
to a formulation based on game theory such that each user
aims to maximize its social group utility. We thus formulate
the decision making problem among the users as a strategic
game Γ = (N , {Xn}n∈N , {Sn}n∈N ), where the set of users
N is the set of players, Xn is the set of strategies for each
user n, and the social group utility function Sn of each user
n is the payoff function of player n. In the sequel, we call the
game Γ as the SGUM game. We next introduce the concept
of socially-aware Nash equilibrium (SNE).
Definition 1. A strategy profile x∗ = (x∗1, ..., x∗N ) is a
socially-aware Nash equilibrium of the SGUM game if no
player can improve its social group utility by unilaterally
changing its strategy, i.e.,
x∗n = arg max
xn∈Xn
Sn(xn, x−n), ∀n ∈ N .
It is worth noting that under different social graphs, the
proposed SGUM game formulation can provide rich flexibility
for modeling the network optimization problem (as illustrated
in Figure 2). When the social graph consists of isolated nodes
with wnm = 0 for any n,m ∈ N (i.e., all users are selfish),
the SGUM game degenerates to the non-cooperative game
formulation. When the social graph is fully meshed with edge
weight wnm = 1 for any n,m ∈ N (i.e., each user is fully
altruistic and cares enough about other users), the SGUM
game becomes the network utility maximization problem,
which aims to maximize the system-wide utility. The SGUM
framework in this study is applicable to general social graphs
and hence can bridge the gap between non-cooperative game
and network utility maximization – two traditionally disjoint
paradigms for network optimization. Roughly speaking, we
can interpret the SGUM framework from the perspective of
information sharing. If in the system more users would like
to share the information of their individual utilities, then more
informed decision making for optimizing the collective per-
formance can be achieved, and hence the system performance
could be improved as the social link density increases.
The SGUM is a general framework that can be applied for
many networking applications. To get a more concrete sense
of the framework, in the following sections, we will study
its applications in database assisted spectrum access, power
control, and random access control.
IV. SOCIAL GROUP UTILITY MAXIMIZATION FOR
DATABASE ASSISTED SPECTRUM ACCESS
In this section we apply the SGUM framework for the
database assisted spectrum access.
A. SGUM Game Formulation
We consider a set of white-space users N = {1, 2, ..., N}
where N is the total number of users. We denote the set of
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Fig. 3. An illustration of database assisted spectrum access
TV channels as M = {1, 2, ...,M}. According to the recent
ruling by FCC [16], to protect the incumbent primary TV
users, each white-space user n ∈ N will first send a spectrum
access request message containing its geo-location information
to a Geo-location database (see Figure 3 for an illustration).
The database then feeds back the set of vacant channels
Mn ∈ M and the allowable transmission power level Pn
to user n. The ruling by FCC indicates that the allowable
transmission power limit for personal/portable white-space
devices (e.g., mobile phones) is 100 mW [16]. For ease of
exposition, we hence assume that each user n accesses the
white-space spectrum with the same power level. Each user n
then chooses a feasible channel an from the vacant channel
set Mn for data transmission. Although the database-assisted
approach obviates the need of spectrum sensing by individual
users, it remains challenging to achieve reliable distributed
spectrum access, because many different white-space users
may choose to access the same vacant channel and thus incur
severe interference to each other [17], [18].
To stimulate effective cooperation among users for interfer-
ence mitigation, we leverage the social ties among users and
apply the SGUM approach. To capture the physical coupling
and account for the accumulative nature of interference, we
construct the physical interference graph Gp = {N , Ep} based
on the physical interference model [19]. Here the set of
white-space users N is the vertex set, and Ep , {(n,m) :
epnm = 1, ∀n,m ∈ N} is the edge set where epnm = 1
if and only if users n and m can receive interference from
each other1. To account for the potential interference from
every user choosing the same vacant channel, we can regard
the interference graph Gp as a complete graph. Nevertheless,
our model can also apply for the case that the underlying
interference graph is undirected but not complete. This can be
applicable, for example, when we would like to factor those
users can generate significant impact only and neglect the users
that are too far away (e.g., with the interference power even
less than the noise) [20]. Let a = (a1, ..., aN ) ∈
∏N
n=1Mn
be the channel selection profile of all users. Given the channel
selection profile a, the total interference received by user n
can be computed as
γn(a) =
∑
m∈Npn
Pmd
−α
mnI{an=am} + ω
n
an
. (2)
Here α is the path loss factor and I{A} is an indicator function
1The physical interference model enables us to capture the cumulative
nature of interference by defining the individual utility function based on
user’s total received interference from other users. This is different from
the protocol interference graph model where two neighboring users’ data
transmissions are blocked once they transmit simultaneously over the same
vacant channel.
with I{A} = 1 if the event A is true and I{A} = 0 otherwise.
Furthermore, ωnan denotes the noise power including the
interference from primary TV users on the channel an. We
then define the individual utility function Un(a) as
Un(a) = −γn(a) = −
∑
m∈Npn
Pmd
−α
mnI{an=am} − ω
n
an
. (3)
Here the negative sign comes from the convention that utility
functions are typically the ones to be maximized. The in-
dividual utility of user n reflects the fact that each user n
has interest to reduce its own received interference. Similar
to many previous studies such as [21]–[23], we focus on
the objective of interference minimization. By exploiting the
additive structure of the accumulative interference functions,
we are going to analyze the SGUM game for interference
minimization by resorting to the useful tool of potential
game [24]. Note that, although from the individual utility
perspective maximizing a user’s data rate is equivalent to
minimizing its received interference, this may not be true from
the social group utility perspective. Due to the complicated
couplings among users in both social and physical domains,
the SGUM game of data rate maximization is technically very
challenging, and the potential game approach can not apply in
this case.
Next, given the social ties (i.e., wij ) among the users on
the social graph Gs, we can define the social group utility
function Si of user i according to (1). We then formulate the
database assisted spectrum access problem with social ties as
a SGUM game Γ = (N , {an}, {Sn}), where the set of white-
space users N is the set of players, the set of vacant channels
Mn is the set of strategies for each player n, and the social
group utility function Sn of each user n is the payoff function
of player n.
B. Properties of SGUM game
We next study the existence of SNE of the SGUM game
for database assisted spectrum access. Here we resort to the
tool of potential game [24].
Definition 2. A game is called a potential game if it admits
a potential function Φ(a) such that for every n ∈ N and
a−n ∈
∏
i6=nMi, for any an, a
′
n ∈ Mn,
Sn(a
′
n, a−n)− Sn(an, a−n) = Φ(a
′
n, a−n)− Φ(an, a−n).
(4)
An appealing property of a potential game with a finite
strategy set is that it always admits a Nash equilibrium, and
any strategy profile that maximizes the potential function
Φ(a) is a Nash equilibrium [24]. For the SGUM game Γ
for database assisted spectrum access, we can show that it
is a potential game. For ease of exposition, we first introduce
the physical-social graph Gsp = {N , Esp} to capture both
physical coupling and social coupling simultaneously. Here the
vertex set is the same as the user set N and the edge set is
given as Esp = {(n,m) : espnm , esnm · epnm = 1, ∀n,m ∈ N}
where espnm = 1 if and only if users n and m have social
tie between each other (i.e., esnm = 1) and can also generate
interference to each other (i.e., epnm = 1). We denote the set of
users that have social ties and can also generate interference
to user n as N spn = {m : e
sp
nm = 1, ∀m ∈ N}.
Based on the physical-social graph Gsp, we show in The-
orem 1 that the SGUM game Γ is a potential game with the
following potential function
Φ(a) =−
1
2
N∑
n=1
∑
m∈Npn
Pmd
−α
mnI{an=am} −
N∑
n=1
ωnan
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Φ1(a): due to Physical Coupling
−
1
2
N∑
n=1
∑
m∈N spn
wnmPmd
−α
mnI{an=am}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Φ2(a): due to Social Coupling
. (5)
The potential function in (5) can be decomposed into two
parts: Φ1(a) and Φ2(a). The first part Φ1(a) reflects the
system-wide interference level (including background noise)
due to physical coupling in the physical domain and the second
part Φ2(a) captures the interdependence of user utilities (i.e.,
the received interferences) due to social coupling in the social
domain.
Theorem 1. When the transmission power of the users are
the same (i.e., Pn = Pm), the physical interference graph is
undirected and the social tie between two users is symmetric
(i.e., wnm = wmn), the SGUM game for database assisted
spectrum access is a potential game with the potential function
Φ(a) given in (5), and hence has a SNE.
The proof can be found in the online appendix [25]. Note
that when wnm = 0 for any user n,m ∈ N (i.e., all users are
selfish), the potential function Φ(a) = Φ1(a), which does not
involve the social coupling part Φ2(a). In this case, the SGUM
game Γ for database assisted spectrum access degenerates to
the non-cooperative spectrum access game. When wnm = 1
for any user n,m ∈ N (i.e., all users are fully altruistic), the
potential function Φ(a) =
∑N
n=1 Un(a), which is the system-
wide utility. In this case, the SGUM becomes the network
utility maximization.
We next design a distributed spectrum access algorithm that
can achieve the SNE of the SGUM game Γ for database
assisted spectrum access.
C. Distributed Spectrum Access Algorithm For Social Group
Utility Maximization
In this section we study the distributed spectrum access
algorithm design.
1) Algorithm Design Principles: According to the property
of potential game, any channel selection profile a that maxi-
mizes the potential function Φ(a) is a Nash equilibrium [24].
We hence design a distributed spectrum access algorithm that
achieves the SNE of the SGUM Γ by maximizing the potential
function Φ(a). Note that since the SGUM game is a potential
game, one can choose to use the asynchronous best response
update approach such that in each iteration a user is selected
to optimize its own strategy [26]. However, there are several
drawbacks associated with the asynchronous best response
update approach for our problem: (1) the asynchronous best
response update is sensitive to the initial state as well as
the update sequence. This implies that given different initial
channel selections and different channel update schedules,
the spectrum access algorithm based on the asynchronous
best response update may reach different convergent points;
(2) as the potential function of the SGUM game captures
both physical and social couplings among users for interfer-
ence minimization, a larger value of potential function which
implies a lower interference level is hence more desirable.
However, the asynchronous best response update (such that
each user locally and greedily optimizes its own strategy)
may get stuck at a local optimum of the potential function.
Thus, this motivates us to design the distributed spectrum
access algorithm based on Markov chain design, which can
converge to a unique stationary distribution regardless of the
given initial channel selection and update sequence. Moreover,
we show that the algorithm can asymptotically converge to the
global optimum of the potential function with an arbitrarily
large probability. Note that one may consider to adopt the
learning algorithm in [27] to achieve an efficient equilibrium.
However, the algorithm in [27] requires the strong assumptions
of synchronization and interdependence, which are difficult to
be satisfied in our case.
To proceed, first consider the problem that the users collec-
tively compute the optimal channel selection profile such that
the potential function is maximized, i.e.,
max
a∈Ω,
∏
N
n=1
Mn
Φ(a). (6)
The problem (6) involves a combinatorial optimization over
the discrete solution space Ω. In general, it is very challenging
to solve such a problem exactly especially when the system
size is large (i.e., the solution space Ω is large).
We then consider to approach the potential function maxi-
mization solution approximately. To proceed, we first write the
problem (6) as the following equivalent randomized problem:
max
(qa≥0:a∈Ω)
∑
a∈Ω qaΦ(a) (7)
s.t.
∑
a∈Ω qa = 1,
where qa is the probability that channel selection profile a is
adopted. Obviously, the optimal solution to problem (7) is to
choose the optimal channel selection profiles with probability
one. It is known from the Markov approximation approach
[28] that problem (7) can be approximated by the following
convex optimization problem:
max
(qa≥0:a∈Ω)
∑
a∈Ω qaΦ(a)−
1
θ
∑
a∈Ω qa ln qa (8)
s.t.
∑
a∈Ω qa = 1,
where θ is the parameter that controls the approximation
ratio. Note that the approximation in (8) can guarantee the
asymptotic optimality. This is because that when θ →∞, the
problem (8) boils down to exactly the same as problem (7).
That is, when θ →∞, the optimal solutions that maximize the
potential function Φ(a) will be selected with probability one.
Moreover, the approximation in (8) enables us to obtain the
close-form solution, which facilitates the distributed algorithm
design later. More specifically, by the KKT conditions [29],
the optimal solution to problem (8) is given as
q∗
a
=
exp(θΦ(a))∑
aˆ∈Ω exp(θΦ(aˆ))
. (9)
Inspired by the idea of Glauber dynamics [30]–[33], based
on (9) we then design a self-organizing algorithm such that
the asynchronous channel selection updates of the users form
Algorithm 1 Distributed Spectrum Access Algorithm For
Social Group Utility Maximization
1: initialization:
2: set the parameter θ and the channel update rate τn.
3: choose a channel an ∈ Mn randomly for each user
n ∈ N .
4: end initialization
5: loop for each user n ∈ N in parallel:
6: compute the social group utility Sn(an, a−n) on the
chosen channel an.
7: generate a timer value following the exponential dis-
tribution with the mean equal to 1
τn
.
8: count down until the timer expires.
9: if the timer expires then
10: choose a new channel a′n ∈Mn randomly.
11: compute the social group utility Sn(a
′
n, a−n) on
the new channel a′n.
12: stay in the new channel a′n with probability
exp
(
θSn(a
′
n,a−n)
)
max{exp(θSn(a′n,a−n)),exp(θSn(an,a−n))}
, Or move back
to the original channel an with probability 1 −
exp
(
θSn(a
′
n,a−n)
)
max{exp(θSn(a′n,a−n)),exp(θSn(an,a−n))}
.
13: end if
14: end loop
a Markov chain (with the system state as the channel selection
profile a of all users). As long as the Markov chain con-
verges to the stationary distribution as given in (9), we can
approach the Nash equilibrium channel selection profile that
maximizes the potential function by setting a large enough
parameter θ. We should emphasize that the existing works
such as [30]–[33] focus on the NUM problem, whereas in
this paper we consider the SGUM problem, which has sig-
nificant differences. For example, for NUM, the optimization
objective of each user is aligned. In contrast, for SGUM,
different users have different optimization objectives due to the
heterogenous social coupling among them. The existing works
use the transition probability matrix for Markov chain design
based on the canonical Glauber dynamics. In contrast, in this
paper we leverage the structural property of the SGUM game
to devise the transition probability for the spectrum access
Markov chain. We also quantify the impact of social tie on
the networking performance, which has not been found in the
existing works.
2) Markov Chain Design for Distributed Spectrum Access:
Motivated by the adaptive CSMA mechanism [28], [31], we
propose a distributed spectrum access algorithm in Algorithm
1 such that each user n updates its channel selection according
to a timer value that follows the exponential distribution with
a rate of τn.
Appealing to the property of exponential distributions, we
have that the probability that more than one users generate the
same timer value and update their channels simultaneously
equals zero. Since one user will activate for the channel
selection update at a time, the direct transitions between two
system states a and a′ are feasible if these two system states
differ by one and only one user’s channel selection. We also
denote the set of system states that can be transited directly
from the state a as ∆a = {a
′
∈ Ω : |{a
′
∪a}\{a
′
∩a}| = 2},
where | · | denotes the size of a set. According to (1), a
user n can compute the social group utility Sn(a) by locally
enquiring the users having social ties with it about their
received interferences. Then user n will randomly choose a
new channel a′n ∈ Mn and stay in this channel with a
probability of
exp
(
θSn(a
′
n, a−n)
)
max{exp (θSn(a
′
n, a−n)) , exp (θSn(an, a−n))}
. (10)
The underlying rationale behind (10) is as follows. When
Sn(a
′
n, a−n) ≥ Sn(an, a−n) (i.e., the new channel a
′
n offers
the better performance), user n will stay in the new channel
a
′
n with probability one. According to the property of potential
game in (4), we know that choosing the new channel a′n
can help to increase both user n’s social group utility Sn(a)
and the potential function Φ(a) of the SGUM game. When
Sn(a
′
n, a−n) < Sn(an, a−n) (i.e., the original channel an
offers the better performance), user n will switch back to the
original channel an with a probability of 1−
exp
(
θSn(a
′
n,a−n)
)
exp(θSn(an,a−n))
.
That is, the probability that user n will switch back to
the original channel an increases with the performance gap
Sn(an, a−n)−Sn(a
′
n, a−n). We would like to emphasize that
such probabilistic channel selections are necessary such that
all the users can explore the feasible channel selection space to
prevent the algorithm from getting stuck at a local optimum.
Then from a system-wide perspective, the probability of
transition from state (an, a−n) to (a
′
n, a−n) due to user n’s
channel selection update is given as
1
|Mn|
exp
(
θSn(a
′
n, a−n)
)
max{exp (θSn(a
′
n, a−n)) , exp (θSn(an, a−n))}
.
(11)
Since each user n activates its channel selection update ac-
cording to the countdown timer mechanism with a rate of τn,
hence if a′ ∈ ∆a, the transition rate from state a to state a
′
is given as
q
a,a
′ =
τn
|Mn|
exp
(
θSn(a
′
n, a−n)
)
max{exp (θSn(a
′
n, a−n)) , exp (θSn(an, a−n))}
.
(12)
Otherwise, we have q
a,a
′ = 0. We show in Theorem 2
that the spectrum access Markov chain is time reversible.
Time reversibility means that when tracing the Markov chain
backwards, the stochastic behavior of the reverse Markov
chain remains the same. A nice property of a time reversible
Markov chain is that it always admits a unique stationary
distribution, which is independent of the initial system state.
This implies that given any initial channel selections the
distributed spectrum access algorithm can drive the system
converging to the stationary distribution given in (9).
Theorem 2. The distributed spectrum access algorithm in-
duces a time-reversible Markov chain with the unique station-
ary distribution as given in (9).
The proof is given in the online appendix [25]. To imple-
ment the distributed spectrum access algorithm, as mentioned
in Section III, each user can first identify the social tie with
other users prior to the spectrum access process. Then a user
can locally measure its received interference and exchange this
information with its social friends for computing the social
group utility, which will be used for channel selection update.
We next analyze the convergence time of the proposed
algorithm in terms of mixing time in Markov chain [34]. Let
q
∗ denote the stationary distribution in (9) and qt(a0) denote
the distribution of the spectrum access Markov chain at time t
for a given initial channel selection state a0. Then, according
to [34], for ǫ > 0, the mixing time of the chain is defined by
Tǫ , inf{t ≥ 0 : max
a0∈Ω
||qt(a0)− q
∗||TV ≤ ǫ},
where the total variation distance is given by
||qt(a0)− q
∗||TV ,
1
2
∑
a∈Ω
|qa,t(a0), q
∗
a|.
We further denote Mmax = maxn∈N |Mn|, Mmin =
minn∈N |Mn| > 0, τmax = maxn∈N τn, τmin = minn∈N τn,
Φmax = maxa∈ΩΦ(a), Φmin = mina∈ΩΦ(a). By resorting
to the tools of spectral analysis and path coupling [28], [34],
we can show in Theorem 3 the convergence time of the
spectrum access Markov chain.
Theorem 3. For a general θ ∈ (0,∞), the mixing time of the
spectrum access Markov chain is upper-bounded as
Tǫ≤
NM2N+3max τmax
Mminτ
2
min
exp (4θ(Φmax − Φmin))
×
[
2 ln
1
2ǫ
+N lnMmax + θ(Φmax − Φmin)
]
.
When θ ∈ (0, θth) where θth ,
1
Φmax−Φmin
ln
(
NM2minτmin
(N−1)Mmaxτmax
)
, we have a tighter upper
bound as
Tǫ ≤ ln
N
ǫ
Mmin
Mmaxτmax
exp(θ(Φmax − Φmin))
M2
min
τmin
Mmaxτmax
+ 1−N
N
exp(θ(Φmax − Φmin))
.
The proof is given in the online appendix [25]. Theorem
3 provides an upper-bound of the convergence time of the
distributed spectrum access algorithm. In particular, it reveals
when the parameter θ is small, the proposed spectrum access
algorithm scales very well (in the order of O(lnN)) with the
increase of user size N .
Note that compared with existing studies [30]–[33] on
applying the Glauber dynamics, we have the following new
contributions for the convergence time analysis: 1) we use the
spectral gap analysis to show the mixing time upper-bound
for a general parameter θ, and the existing studies only show
the mixing time upper-bound when the parameter θ is within
some specific range by adopting the path coupling method.
This is due to the restriction that the path coupling approach
imposes some structural condition on the Markov chain; 2)
since in our problem the underlying optimization objective and
the Markov chain structure are different from existing studies,
we have carefully constructed a discrete-time Markov chain by
uniformization of the original spectrum access Markov chain,
and showed that when θ < θth the constructed Markov chain
satisfies the one-step path coupling condition. This leads to
significant differences from the existing works when applying
3) Performance Analysis: According to Theorem 2, we can
achieve the SNE that maximizes the potential function Φ(a)
of the SGUM game Γ by setting θ →∞. However, in practice
one has to choose to implement only a finite value of θ (e.g.,
to reduce the convergence time). Let Φθ =
∑
a∈Ω q
∗
aΦ(a) be
the expected potential by Algorithm 1 with a given θ and
Φ∗ = maxa∈ΩΦ(a) be the maximum potential. We show
in Theorem 4 that, when a large enough θ is adopted in
practice, the gap between Φθ and Φ∗ is negligible. Combining
Theorems 3 and 4, we see that in practice by tuning the
parameter θ, we can significantly reduce the convergence time
(at the order of eθ) at the cost of a relatively small performance
loss (at the order of θ−1). This has also been corroborated by
the numerical result in Section IV-D.
Theorem 4. For the distributed spectrum access algorithm
with a finite θ, we have that 0 ≤ Φ∗−Φθ ≤ 1θ
∑N
n=1 ln |Mn|,
where |Mn| denotes the number of vacant channels of user
n.
The proof is given in the online appendix [25]. We next
benchmark the performance of the solution by the distributed
spectrum access algorithm with respect to the system optimal
solution. Let V (a) be the total individual utility received
by all the users under the channel selection profile a (i.e.,
V (a) =
∑N
n=1 Un(a)) and Vθ be the total utility of the
solution by the distributed spectrum access algorithm with
a finite θ (i.e., Vθ =
∑
a∈Ω q
∗
a
V (a)). We denote a as the
NUM solution that maximizes the system-wide utility (i.e.,
a = argmaxa∈Ω V (a)). We then define the performance gap
ρθ as the difference between the total utility received at the
NUM solution a and that of the distributed spectrum access
algorithm with a finite θ (i.e., ρθ = V (a)− Vθ). We have the
following result.
Theorem 5. For a finite θ < ∞, the performance gap ρθ of
the distributed spectrum access algorithm is at most
1
θ
N∑
n=1
ln |Mn|+
1
2
N∑
n=1
∑
m∈N spn
(1 − wnm)Pmd
−α
mn
+
1
2
N∑
n=1
∑
m∈Npn\N
sp
n
Pmd
−α
mn.
The proof is given in the online appendix [25]. Let aˆ as the
convergent SNE by the distributed spectrum access algorithm
when θ → ∞ (i.e., aˆ = argmaxa∈ΩΦ(a)). According to
Theorem 5, the performance gap of the SNE aˆ is given as
follows.
Corollary 1. When θ →∞, the performance gap of the SNE
aˆ by the distributed spectrum access algorithm is at most
1
2
N∑
n=1
∑
m∈N spn
(1− wnm)Pmd
−α
mn +
1
2
N∑
n=1
∑
m∈Npn\N
sp
n
Pmd
−α
mn.
From the results above we see that the upper-bound of the
performance gap decreases as the strength of social tie wnm
among users increases. When wnm = 1 for any user n,m ∈ N
(i.e., all users are fully altruistic), the SGUM becomes the
NUM and the performance gap is zero. In Section IV-D,
we also evaluate the performance of the SGUM solution by
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Fig. 4. A square area of a length of 500 m with 8 scattered white-space
users
real social data traces. Numerical results demonstrate that the
performance gap between the SGUM solution and the NUM
solution is at most 15%.
D. Numerical Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the SGUM solution for database
assisted spectrum access by numerical studies based on both
Erdos-Renyi social graphs and real trace based social graphs.
1) Social Graph with 8 White-Space Users: We first con-
sider a database assisted spectrum access network consisting
of M = 5 channels and N = 8 white-space users, which
are scattered across a square area of a length of 500 m (see
Figure 4). The transmission power of each user is Pn = 100
mW [16], the path loss factor α = 4, and the background
interference power ωnm for each channel m and user n is
randomly assigned in the interval of [−100,−90] dBm. Each
user n has a different set of vacant channels by consulting the
geo-location database. For example, the vacant channels for
user 1 are {2, 3, 4}. For the interference graph Gp, we define
that the user’s transmission range δ = 500 m and two users
can generate inference to each other if their distance is not
greater than δ. The social graph Gs is given in Figure 4 where
two users have social tie if there is an edge between them and
the numerical value associated with each edge represents the
strength of social tie.
We implement the proposed distributed spectrum access
algorithm for the SGUM game with different parameters θ in
Figure 5. We see that the convergent potential function value
Φ of the SGUM game increases as the parameter θ increases.
When the parameter θ is large enough (e.g., θ ≥ 106), the
algorithm can approach the maximum potential function value
Φ∗ = maxa Φ(a). To verify that the algorithm can approach
the SNE of the SGUM game, we show the dynamics of the
potential value Φ(a) in Figure 6. We see that the distributed
spectrum access algorithm can drive the potential value Φ
increasing and approach the maximum potential value Φ∗.
According to the property of potential game, the algorithm
hence can approach the SNE of the SGUM game.
To verify the trade-off between the performance and the
convergence time, we show in Figure 7 the number iterations
for convergence by the distributed spectrum access algorithm
with different maximum allowable performance loss (by tun-
ing the parameter θ). We see that, compared with the case
with the optimal performance, if we allow at most 10% and
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with different number of users
20% performance loss, then we can reduce the convergence
time by up-to 69% and 83%, respectively.
2) Erdos-Renyi Social Graph: We then consider N = 100
users that randomly scattered across a square area of a length
of 2000 m. We evaluate the SGUM game solution by the
distributed spectrum access algorithm with the social graph
represented by the Erdos-Renyi (ER) graph model [35], where
a social link exists between any two users with a probability
of PL. We set the strength of social tie wnm = 1 for each
social link. To evaluate the impact of social link density of
the social graph, we implement the simulations with different
social link probabilities PL = 0, 0.1, ..., 1.0, respectively. For
each given PL, we average over 100 runs. To benchmark the
SGUM solution, we also implement the the following two
solutions:
(1) Non-cooperative spectrum access: we implement the
non-cooperative game based solution such that each user aims
to maximize its individual utility, i.e., we set Sn(a) = Un(a)
in the distributed spectrum access algorithm.
(2) Network utility maximization: we implement the social
optimal solution such that the system-wide utility is maxi-
mized, i.e., we set Sn(a) =
∑N
n=1 Un(a) in the distributed
spectrum access algorithm.
Similar to the price of anarchy in non-cooperative game
[36], we normalize the system-wide interference of these
solutions with respect to that of the social optimal solution
(i.e., network utility maximum solution). The results are given
in Figure 8. We see that the performance of the SGUM solution
always dominates that of the non-cooperative spectrum access.
This is non-trivial since non-cooperative game promotes the
competition among users to increase the system-wide utility
and has been widely adopted to devise efficient distributed
resource allocation mechanisms in wireless networks [37].
Moreover, we observe that the performance gain of the SGUM
solution increases as the social link probability PL increases.
When the social link probability PL = 1, the SGUM solution
achieves the same performance of the network utility maxi-
mization and can reduce 23% system-wide interference over
the non-cooperative spectrum access. This also demonstrates
that the proposed SGUM framework spans the continuum
between non-cooperative game and network utility maximiza-
tion – two extreme paradigms based on drastically different
assumptions that users are selfish and altruistic, respectively.
We then investigate the scenario that a user may only take
into nearby users with social ties. This can correspond to the
case that a user can only detect the social friends within a
fixed physical distance. In the simulation we set the social
link probability PL = 0.5 and set the social detection range
for identifying nearby social friends as 20m, 50m, ..., 400m,
respectively. We see from Figure 9 that the performance of
SGUM solution improves as the social detection range in-
creases. Intuitively, when the social detection range increases,
the number of social links increases and hence the performance
of SGUM solution improves.
3) Real Trace Based Social Graph: We next evaluate the
SGUM solution by the distributed spectrum access algorithm
based on the social graph represented by the friendship net-
work of the real data trace Brightkite [38]. Brightkite contains
an explicit friendship network among the users. Different from
the Erdos-Renyi (ER) social graph, the friendship network of
Brightkite is scale-free such that the node degree distribution
follows a power law [39]. We implement experiments with
the number of users N = 200, 300, ..., 600, respectively. We
randomly select N nodes from Brightkite and construct the
social graph based on the friendship relationship among these
N nodes in the friendship network of Brightkite. For each
given N , we average over 1000 runs. As the benchmark,
we also implement the solutions of non-cooperative spectrum
access and network utility maximization.
The results are shown in Figure 10. We see that the
non-cooperative spectrum access solution will increase the
system-wide interference up-to 29% over the network utility
maximization solution. Upon comparison, the system-wide
interference by the the SGUM solution will increase at most
15%, compared with the network utility maximization solu-
tion. This verifies the effectiveness of leveraging social tie to
stimulate user cooperation for achieving efficient distributed
spectrum access in practices.
V. SOCIAL GROUP UTILITY MAXIMIZATION BASED
POWER CONTROL
In this section we study power control under the SGUM
framework. Note that existing literature (e.g., [40], [41]) on
power control game typically assume that users are selfish and
do not take the social factors into account. In this section, we
will investigate the impact of the social ties among the users
on the system performance.
A. SGUM Game Formulation
We consider a set of users under the physical interference
model, where user i is a link consisting of a transmitter Ti
and a receiver Ri. The channel gain of communication link i
is hi, and the channel gain of the interference link between
transmitter Ti and receiver Rj is gij . The noise at receiver
Ri is ni. Note that here we can view the physical graph Gp
among users as a complete graph and the degree of physical
coupling (i.e., interference) between any two users is captured
by the channel gain. Then the signal to interference and noise
ratio (SINR) γi of link i is given by
γi(pi, p−i) =
hipi
ni +
∑N
j=1 gjipj
,
where pi denotes the transmit power of Ti. We consider that
the individual utility Ui of user i is given by
Ui(pi, p−i) = log(γj)− cipi,
where ci denotes the cost of per unit power consumption.
Similar to many studies [40], [41], here we use the logarithmic
function to model the utility of a user.
Then, given the social ties (i.e., wij ) among the users on
the social graph Gs, we can define the social group utility
function Si of user i accordingly to (1). We then formulate
the power control problem with social ties as a SGUM game
Λ , (N , {pi}, {Si}).
B. SGUM Game Analysis
For ease of exposition, we will first focus on the SGUM
based power control game with two users, because the two-
user case can shed light on the impact of social ties on users’
strategies and social welfare.
݌ௌோ ݌ே஼ǡோ 
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Fig. 11. For the two-user SGUM based power control game, as social tie
w , w12 = w21 increases from 0 to 1, each user’s SNE strategy pSNE
migrates from its NE strategy pNC,NE for a standard NCG to its social
optimal strategy pSO for NUM. The social welfare of the SNE vSNE also
migrates correspondingly.
Theorem 6. For the two-user SGUM based power control
game, there exists a unique SNE, where
pSNE1 =
√
α21 + β1 − α1, p
SNE
2 =
√
α22 + β2 − α2
with
α1 ,
w12g12 + c1n2 − g12
2c1g12
, β1 ,
n2
c1g12
and
α2 ,
w21g21 + c2n1 − g21
2c2g21
, β2 ,
n1
c2g21
.
The proof is given in the online appendix [25]. Using
Theorem 6, we have the following result.
Corollary 2. For the two-user SGUM based power control
game, each user’s SNE strategy decreases when its social tie
with the other increases.
Corollary 2 shows that a users’ SNE strategy is monotoni-
cally decreasing with the social tie. The following result shows
that the social welfare of the SNE is also a monotonic function
of social ties.
Proposition 1. For the two-user SGUM based power control
game, the social welfare of the SNE increases when social ties
increase.
The proof is given in in the online appendix [25]. According
to Proposition 1, as illustrated in Figure 11, when the social tie
increases from 0 to 1, a user’s SNE strategy migrates from its
NE strategy for a standard NCG to its social optimal strategy
for NUM.
We next study the existence of SNE for the SGUM based
power control game with multiple users. Motivated by the
observation that the two-user game is supermodular such that
∂2S1(p1, p2)
∂p1∂p2
> 0 and ∂
2S2(p2, p1)
∂p2∂p1
> 0,
we have the following result.
Theorem 7. The SGUM based power control game with
multiple users is a supermodular game, and thus there exists
at least one SNE.
The proof is given in the online appendix [25]. Since the
SGUM game for power control is a supermodular game,
similar to the scheme in [42], users can start from the smallest
transmission power (i.e., pi = 0, ∀i ∈ N ) and use asyn-
chronous best response updates, so that their strategies will
converge to a SNE. The game with more than two users does
not yield closed-form SNE strategies, and hence is difficult
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to analyze the impact of social tie on system performance. In
the following section we will use numerical results to show
that the insight we draw from the analysis of the two-user
case also holds for the general multi-user case: the SNE for
SGUM migrates monotonically from the NE for NCG to the
social optimal solution for NUM.
C. Numerical Results
We consider N users, each of which is a link consisting
of a transmitter and a receiver. Each transmitter or receiver
is randomly located in a square area with side length 500m.
Under the physical interference model, we assume that the
channel condition of a link (communication or interference
link) only depends on the path loss effect with path loss factor
3. We assume that the transmit power of each link is 1W and
the noise power at each receiver is 0.1W. We simulate the
social graph based on the Erdos-Renyi (ER) graph, and the
real data trace of the friendship network from Brightkite. We
set the social tie of a social link as 1 if it exists.
Figure 12 shows the normalized social welfare for a varying
number of users N . For the Erdos-Renyi (ER) graph, the
social link probability PL = 0.5. We can see that the SGUM
solution for the ER model based social graph can achieve a
performance gain up to 23% over the NCG solution, and its
performance loss from the NUM solution is at most 10%.
The SGUM solution for the real data based social graph can
achieve a performance gain up to 15%.
Figure 13 shows the normalized social welfare as the social
link density probability PL in the ER graph varies from 0 to
1. We set the number of users N as 20. We observe that as PL
increases, the social welfare of the SNE for the SGUM game
increases monotonically from that of NE for NCG to that of
the social optimal solution for NUM. This demonstrates that
the SGUM spans the continuum between NCG and NUM.
VI. SOCIAL GROUP UTILITY MAXIMIZATION BASED
RANDOM ACCESS CONTROL
In this section we study random access control under the
SGUM framework. Note that most existing work (e.g., [43],
[44]) on random access control game assume that users are
selfish and do not take the social factors into account. To
best of our knowledge, [45] is the most related work, which
considers a two-user socially-aware random access control
game with the assumption that the social tie among the two
users are symmetric. While, we study the general case of
multi-user socially-aware random access control game with
asymmetric/sysmetric social ties among the users.
A. SGUM Game Formulation
We consider a set of users under the protocol interference
model, where user i is a link consisting of transmitter Ti
and receiver Ri. We can construct the the physical graph
Gp among users for the random access control as follows.
Let I+i denote the set of receivers that transmitter Ti cause
interference to, and I−i denote the set of transmitters that
causes interference to receiver Ri. Each user i contends for the
opportunity of data transmission with probability qi ∈ [0, 1]
in a time slot. If multiple interfering links contend in the
same time slot, a collision occurs and no link can grab the
transmission opportunity. Then the probability bi that user i
can grab the transmission opportunity is given by
bi(qi, q−i) = qi
∏
j∈I−
i
(1− qj).
We assume that the individual utility of user i is given by
Ui(qi, q−i) = log(zibi(qi, q−i))− ciqi,
where zi > 0 represents user i’s efficiency of utilizing the
transmission opportunity (e.g., transmission rate), and ci > 0
represents user i’s cost of contention (e.g., energy consump-
tion).
Then, given the social ties (i.e., wij ) among the users on
the social graph Gs, we can define the social group utility
function Si of user i accordingly to (1). We then formulate
the random access control problem with social ties as a SGUM
game Ξ , (N , {qi}, {Si}).
B. SGUM Game Analysis
For the SGUM based random access control game, we have
the following result.
Theorem 8. For the SGUM based random access control
game, there exists a unique SNE, where for any user i ∈ N ,
the access probability qSNEi is∑
j∈I+
i
wij + 1 + ci −
√
(
∑
j∈I+
i
wij + 1 + ci)2 − 4ci
2ci
.
(13)
The proof is given in the online appendix [25]. Using
Theorem 8, by showing the first-order derivative of the access
probability qSNEi in terms of wij is negative, we have the
following result.
Corollary 3. For the SGUM based random access control
game, each user’s SNE strategy decreases when its social ties
with others increase.
Corollary 3 shows that a users’ SNE strategy is mono-
tonically decreasing with the social tie. Intuitively, when a
user’s access probability increases, it increases the collision
probability of the users within its interference range, and
hence reduces their individual utilities. Therefore, a user
would reduce its access probability when its social ties with
those within its interference range increase (as illustrated in
Figure 14). Furthermore, Theorem 8 shows that each user’s
ݍௌோ ݍே஼ǡோ 
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Fig. 14. For a two-user SGUM based random access control game, as social
tie w , w12 = w21 increases from 0 to 1, each user’s SNE strategy qSNE
migrates from its NE strategy qNC,NE for a standard NCG to its socially
optimal strategy qSO for NUM. The social welfare of the SNE vSNE also
migrates correspondingly.
SNE strategy is independent of other users’ strategies, but
depends on the user’s social ties with others. This can facilitate
the implementation of the SGUM game solution for random
access control in a distributed manner, such that each user i
locally sets the access probability accordingly to the social ties
of its neighbors.
The following result shows that the social welfare of the
SNE is also a monotonic function of social ties.
Proposition 2. For the SGUM based random access control
game, the social welfare of the SNE increases when social ties
increase.
The proof is given in the online appendix [25]. Intuitively,
since users’ individual utilities are summed up with equal
weights in the social welfare, a user’s SNE strategy becomes
closer to its social optimal strategy when other users weigh
more (i.e., the social ties increase) in that user’s social group
utility, and the social welfare also increases. As illustrated in
Figure 14, when social ties increase, a user’s SNE strategy
migrates from its NE strategy for a standard NCG to its
socially optimal strategy for NUM. This demonstrates that the
SGUM game framework spans the continuum between these
traditionally disjoint paradigms.
C. Numerical Results
We consider N users, each of which is a link consisting
of a transmitter and a receiver. Each transmitter or receiver
is randomly located in a square area with side length 500m.
Under the protocol interference model, we assume that a
link causes interference to another link if the former link’s
transmitter is within 100m of the latter link’s receiver. We
simulate the social graph based on the Erdos-Renyi (ER) graph
with the social link probability PL = 0.5, and the real data
trace of the friendship network from Brightkite. We set the
social tie of a social link as 1 if it exists.
To illustrate the system efficiency of the SGUM solution,
we compare it with the NCG solution where each user aims to
maximize its individual utility, and the NUM solution where
the total individual utility of all users is maximized. Figure 15
depicts the social welfare of the SNE for SGUM and the social
optimal solution for NUM normalized with respect to the NE
for NCG, as the number of users increases. We can see that the
SGUM solution for the ER model based social graph always
dominates that of the NCG, with a substantial performance
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Fig. 16. The social group utility maximization (SGUM) game framework
spans the continuum from zero-sum game (ZSG) to general-sum non-
cooperative game (NCG) to network utility maximization (NUM).
gain up to 22%. On the other hand, it performs almost as well
as the NUM solution. This demonstrates that system efficiency
can be significantly improved by exploiting social ties. We
observe that the SGUM solution for the real data based social
graph is worse than that for the ER model based social graph
due to that social ties are weaker in the real data than in the ER
graph with link probability 0.5. However, it still can achieve
a performance gain up to 13% over that of the NCG solution.
VII. FURTHER DISCUSSION
In the sections above, we study the social group utility
maximization (SGUM) framework with the “positive” social
tie between two users (e.g., family members or friends). In
this case, one user cares about the welfare of the other. To
generalize the SGUM framework, we can further consider the
case that the social tie between two users is “negative” (e.g.,
due to malicious behavior) such that one user may intend to
damage the other’s welfare. Hence, the generalized SGUM
framework with both positive and negative social ties can be
very useful for modeling the network security issues.
Formally, we can define that wij ∈ (−∞, 1]: When wij ∈
(0, 1], it represents the extent to which user i cares about user
j’s utility, and it reaches the highest when wij = 1 (i.e., user
i cares about user j’s utility as much as its own utility); when
wij ∈ (−∞, 0), it pinpoints to how much user i intends to
damage user j’s utility, and reaches the extreme as wij goes
to −∞ (i.e., user i would sacrifice all of its own utility to
damage user j’s utility).
Zero-sum game (i.e., all players’ payoffs are summed up to
0) is widely adopted for modelling the interactions between
attackers and defenders in network security problems [46].
Interestingly, the generalized SGUM framework also encom-
passes the zero-sum game as a special case. Specifically, when
the accumulated negative social ties of each user satisfies that∑
j:i∈N s
j
wji = −1, for any i ∈ N , we have that
N∑
i=1
Si(x) =
N∑
i=1
Ui(x) +
N∑
i=1
Ui(x)
∑
j:i∈N s
j
wji = 0.
In this case, the SGUM game degenerates to a zero-sum game,
where each user views the total gain of other users as its loss
(see Figure 16 for an illustration). For example, a SGUM game
of two users with S1 = U1−U2 and S2 = U2−U1, or S1 = U1
and S2 = −U1, is a zero-sum game.
Building on that the generalized SGUM framework with
both positive and negative social ties, we can devise more
effective and efficient defense mechanisms against the attacks
by the malicious users (i.e., users with negative social ties), by
leveraging trustworthy helps and collaborations from the social
friends (i.e., users with positive social ties). Due to space limit,
we will pursuit a thorough understanding of the generalized
SGUM framework in a future work.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have developed a general SGUM frame-
work that highlights the interplay between the physical cou-
pling and the social coupling among users. We showed that
the SGUM framework can provide rich modeling flexibility
and span the continuum between non-cooperative game and
network utility maximization. In particular, we have studied
the application in database assisted spectrum access, power
control, and random access control under this framework. For
the case of database assisted spectrum access, we show that
the SGUM game is a potential game and always admits a
socially-aware Nash equilibrium (SNE). We also design a
distributed spectrum access algorithm that can achieve the
SNE of the game and quantify its performance gap. We
further show that the upper-bound of the performance gap
decreases as the strength of social ties among users increases.
For the cases of power control and random access control,
we showed that there exists a unique SNE. Furthermore, as
the strength of social ties increases from the minimum to
the maximum, a player’s SNE strategy (i.e., transmit power
or access probability) migrates from the Nash equilibrium
strategy in a standard non-cooperative game to the socially-
optimal strategy in network utility maximization.
We are currently studying the SGUM framework with
both positive and negative social ties to build a thorough
understanding of the impact of altruistic and malicious be-
haviors on network performance and security. Beyond the
supermodular/potential game approaches in this paper, one can
resort to other powerful tools such as monotone game to char-
acterize SNE and design distributed mechanisms accordingly.
We believe that this framework will open a new door for future
networking system design by exploiting social interactions.
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